

30 July 1957

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : **Definition of Counterintelligence for
NSCID No. 5**

Pursuant to the direction of General Truscott of
29 July 1957, the attached definition of counterintelligence
is submitted herewith.

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Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

1 Attachment a/s

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For the purpose of this directive] ...

3b. Counterintelligence is broadly defined as that intelligence activity, with its resultant informational product, which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation, and its personnel and installations abroad, against espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversion. As an activity, counterintelligence is the process of procuring, developing, recording, and disseminating information concerning espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversion directed against the national security, and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such acts. Counterintelligence as conducted by Departments and Agencies is defined as all activities, exclusive of espionage, devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and installations or material against sabotage.*

*CIA would prefer to replace "the protection.....sabotage" with the following wording: "the protection of information, personnel, installations, and material against espionage, counterespionage, subversion, sabotage, or unauthorized disclosure." This version is preferred because information, personnel, etc., must each be protected against more than one danger.

(Repeated efforts to interweave the CIA and Army definitions resulted only in ambiguity and duplication.)

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C O P Y
BRIEFED TS-0033-4

The following paragraphs set forth those recommendations of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities which are pertinent to the proposed revision of NSCID #5:

COORDINATION OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

We do not believe that drastic changes in the structure of our national intelligence organization are required to make progress toward some of the objectives we outline below. We do suggest that the Director of Central Intelligence be encouraged to exercise a more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility and we feel that he can do this within the intent of existing laws. If directed and supported by you in discharging this responsibility, the Director of Central Intelligence can accomplish coordination within the national intelligence effort without change in present statute or organization.

* * * * *

CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

Despite his title, the Director of Central Intelligence neither by law, directive nor otherwise, is the central director of the total intelligence effort of the government. Actually his control of intelligence operations is restricted to those of the Central Intelligence Agency. On the other hand, he does have a broad responsibility for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence related to the national security.

But the "dominant" responsibility for the production of "Departmental" intelligence ("subject to refinement through a continuous process of coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence") rests with the head of each of the separate Departments and Agencies represented in the Intelligence Community.

In our judgment this arrangement, with its division of responsibility and despite the elaborate intelligence committee coordinating mechanism which exists, is not any longer adequate. Wherever their Departmental needs are judged by them to be paramount the separate elements of the Intelligence Community are inclined to operate independently. This has resulted in an undue amount of built-in duplication in our national intelligence effort. It has also generated competition and frictions, some long standing, which have impeded the real integration of the intelligence activities of the separate elements of the Intelligence Community.

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We are convinced that a strong centralized direction, under which the resources of the various elements of the Intelligence Community would be brought closer together would do much to strengthen our national intelligence effort and to contain its cost. We therefore recommend that action toward that end be taken, both through the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency.

* * * *

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTION

We recommend that the National Security Council review their Intelligence Directives and substitute a more coherent consolidated Directive or set of Directives for the conduct of our intelligence activities under today's conditions.

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<i>Mr. Cassidy says the Board does not let its reports to the President be used, and suggests using Pat Coyne at NSC to help. It will talk to Coyne.</i>			
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